Quine's criterion of logical truth
In "Carnap and Logical Truth" (from now on: CLT) W. V. O. Quine attacks a view called the "linguistic doctrine of logical truth". He concedes that this doctrine may be more epistemological than lin guistic in nature (cf. CLT 388), and ventures to say that it might be better not to attribute it to Carnap, though he thinks that it corresponds to "Carnap's own orientation and reason ing" (cf. CLT 385).
Quine begins the discussion by presenting a pretheoretical "mark" of logical truth as the fi rst step in the later development of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth. He introduces the criterion in the following passage:
Without thought of any epistemological doctrine, either the linguistic doctrine or another, we may mark out the intended scope of the term 'logical truth', within that of the broader term 'truth', in the following way. First we suppose indicated, by enumeration if not otherwise, what words are to be called logical words; typical ones are 'or', 'not', 'if ', 'then', 'and', 'all', 'every', 'only', 'some'. Th e logical truths, then, are those true sen tences which involve only logical words essentially. What this means is that any other words, though they may also occur in a logical truth (as witness 'Brutus', 'kill' and 'Caesar' in 'Brutus killed or did not kill Caesar'), can be varied at will without engendering falsity. (CLT 387) Now this criterion is one with which Carnap is assumed to agree. Indeed, it is still adopted in textbooks, and even now infl uences and misleads quite a few people. But it is not adequate, even for elementary logic, i.e. fi rst order predicate logic with identity, for which at least it is intended to work. Th is can be shown by means of simple examples. Consider the following sentence of everyday language: 'Th ere are at least two things'. Within the lan guage of fi rst order predicate logic with identity, this sentence from everyday language is paraphrased as follows:
Within the language of second order predicate logic, the sentence may be paraphrased as follows:
Most people will take such a sentence to be true and its negation-(2a) or (2b), respectively-to be false:
Similarly for sentences such as 'Th ere are at least three things', 'Th ere are at least four things' etc. and their negations, as well as for the paraphrases of these sentences and their negations in the language of fi rst order predicate logic with identity or in the language of second order predicate logic. Hardly anybody, however, will take one of these sentences to be either logically true or logically false.
1 It seems to be beyond doubt that which-
